We develop a theory of resource management where the degree to which countries escape the tragedy of the commons, and hence the de facto property rights regime, is endogenously determined. Three forces determine success or failure in resource management: the regulator's enforcement power, the extent of harvesting capacity, and the ability of the resource to generate competitive returns without being extinguished. The model can explain heterogeneity across countries and resources in the e¤ectiveness of resource management, and it predicts that changes in prices, population, and technology can cause transitions to better or worse management regimes. Policy analysis based on the assumption of a …xed degree of property rights protection may lead to serious error.
Many of the world's major renewable resource stocks are in a state of decline. This is true for capture …sheries, for forests in developing countries and for many measures of the biosphere's health. Other renewable resources, including many species of wildlife, marine mammals and coral reefs are also under threat. While poverty and government corruption are surely responsible for some of this record, particular emphasis is often placed on the potentially damaging role played by international trade. This emphasis is not surprising given that natural resource products are a key export for much of the developing world and property rights over renewable resources are both di¢ cult to de…ne and poorly enforced.
But property rights are not an immutable country characteristic such as weather, mineral deposits or topography; they are instead market institutions developed to facilitate transactions and protect scarce resources. Consequently, changes in prices, technology and other e¤ects of market integration may alter the de facto property rights regime and lead to impacts quite di¤erent from those predicted by existing analyses. The purpose of this paper is to examine renewable resource use within a framework where the enforcement of property rights, and hence the e¢ cacy of resource management, is endogenously determined.
We develop a theory where an existing government regulates the use of a renewable resource by a set of agents who have a right to harvest. The resource could be a …shery, forest stock, aquifer, etc., and we assume it is local and therefore contained within one country.
The government sets rules limiting harvests but agents may cheat on these allocations and risk punishment. Property rights are endogenous in this framework because the government must account for agents' incentive to cheat. As a result, the e¤ective protection for the resource -or what we refer to as the de facto property rights regime -may be far from perfect even though property rights would be perfectly enforced if there was no monitoring problem.
Using this theory we divide resource-rich economies into three groups according to their ability to enforce property rights as world prices vary. We refer to these groups as Hardin, Ostrom and Clark economies. The groups are de…ned by simple and intuitive restrictions on basic parameters (resource growth rates, mortality rates, time preference rates, and technologies), and we aggregate these parameters into three intuitive measures that jointly determine success in regulation. These measures re ‡ect a country's enforcement power, its overcapacity, and its incentive to extinguish the resource.
Hardin economies are countries with large numbers of agents who have access to the resource, short life spans, resources with a low intrinsic growth rate, and governments with a limited ability to punish recalcitrant agents.
1 Together these features imply that Hardin economies have limited enforcement power relative to their overcapacity. As a result, they always exhibit de facto open access (in steady state) and no rents are earned on the resource.
Ostrom economies have su¢ cient enforcement power to generate some rents, but not enough to achieve the …rst best.
2 At low prices they exhibit open access, but at high prices a degree of protection is a¤orded the resource, and it generates rents. Clark economies can obtain the …rst best at relatively high resource prices, but at low resource prices, even a Clark economy exhibits open access or limited management.
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Our model is highly stylized and …ts no resource industry exactly; nevertheless we think it can shed light on several policy questions. To make this case, we provide four applications.
First, we examine the e¤ects of trade liberalization in resource-exporting countries. While trade liberalization leads to resource depletion and real income losses in Hardin economies, the trade-induced increase in relative resource prices can lead to a transition to more e¤ective management in Ostrom or Clark economies. We give examples from …sheries and wildlife management consistent with both scenarios.
1 Garrett Hardin was not the …rst to identify the problem of open access nor did he analyze it completely in Hardin (1968) . This was done by Gordon (1954) . Hardin did however popularize the term "Tragedy of the Commons" and his work brought national attention to resource issues.
2 Since Elinor Ostrom has made important contributions to our understanding of when local governance of common property resources will succeed or fail, it seems natural to refer to this class of economies as Ostrom economies. See especially Ostrom (1990) . 3 We name this class of economies after the mathematician Colin Clark whose book Mathematical Bioeconomics has played a major role in the teaching and study of resource economics. See Clark (1990) . See Scott (1955) for the …rst recognition of the resource problem as a capital theoretic one.
Next, we examine the impact of trade restrictions mandated by the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES)
. There is currently a vigorous debate over whether the "sustainable use" of wildlife is helpful or harmful to conservation and what role international trade could play. The parties to CITES are currently experimenting with selective trade liberalization in several species, and our theory provides some guidance as to when these experiments will succeed.
In a third application we examine the role of new technologies in creating the need for regulation. We argue that technological progress played a role in the introduction of modern …sheries regulation, and give examples of heterogeneity across …sheries in the e¤ectiveness of management, as predicted by our theory. This application demonstrates our theory's ability to examine forces other than prices that create regulatory change.
Finally, we examine one aspect of the debate over deforestation. We show how population growth has two potentially o¤setting impacts on forestry regulation: the direct e¤ect of increased population pressure makes regulation more di¢ cult, but the indirect e¤ect of induced price increases can improve regulation. We link this result to recent empirical work on forests in developing countries. While these applications are not a substitute for careful empirical work; they do however demonstrate the broad relevance of our theory. And by linking our predictions to three simple country characteristics -enforcement power, overcapacity, and the incentive to extinguish -we hope to provide a springboard for future empirical research in this area.
To generate these results we combine a standard renewable resource model with a simple model of moral hazard. The model has three key features. First, it is dynamic because this is where the key externality in renewable resource industries arise. If property rights are not de…ned or enforced, then an agent who refrains from harvesting today may not be the one to bene…t from the investment tomorrow. Throughout, we focus on the link between country characteristics and management regimes in steady state, leaving a discussion of the transition between regimes to future work. Second, we assume there is a group of agents who have the right to harvest the resource, but if their harvesting is not regulated, rents will be dissipated and the resource stock depleted. The government manages the resource by limiting harvesting but cheating may occur. Since the incentives of agents do not lead to e¢ cient outcomes, monitoring is required and we have a problem of moral hazard. For tractability, we adopt assumptions leaving both the government and agents risk neutral, and assume limited liability to bound punishments.
Finally, we adopt the relatively simple resource model taken from Brander and Taylor (1997) . There are two sectors, resource harvesting and manufacturing, and for the most part we treat our economy as small on world markets. A general equilibrium framework is necessary for a change in world prices or technologies to a¤ect relative rewards across sectors and in ‡uence the incentive of agents to comply with regulations.
Previous theoretical work on this issue has provided results that are conditioned on the property rights regime. If property rights are fully assigned and perfectly enforced, then the usual gains from trade results apply. On the other hand, if property rights are completely absent, then trade liberalization can be devastating. 4 Similarly, technological progress can only raise consumption possibilities with perfect property rights, but can easily lower them otherwise. There is, however, considerable evidence showing that the enforcement of property rights varies across communities, over time and by resource type. This is a central theme in the book length treatments of Ostrom (1990) and Baland and Platteau (1996) .
Most of their evidence comes from case studies on the management of …sheries, aquifers, forests and common grazing land. Formal empirical evidence on the malleability of property rights is contained in Besley (1995) .
This evidence casts doubt on the conclusions of analyses where the strength of property rights are …xed. Some authors have moved away from the assumption of a given property rights regime to consider the implications of endogenous regulation in a renewable resource 4 For a review of the early literature see Kemp and Long (1984) ; a contemporary review is Bulte and Barbier (2005) . For theory see the early work of Dasgupta (1982) , Chichilnisky (1994) and Brander and Taylor (1997) ; Lopez (1997 Lopez ( , 1998 provides empirical evidence linking weak property regimes to real income losses.
context. A series of papers, following Demsez (1967) , argue that property rights will emerge when the bene…ts exceed the costs. There are many papers on enclosure, some of which discuss incentive schemes to limit over-grazing (see McCarthy (2001) , Margolis (2000) , and the important early work of Weitzman (1974) ). There are papers examining entry deterrence in natural resource settings (see Mason and Polasky (1994) for one example), and there are papers examining poaching (see for example Hotte et al. (2000) ). While this literature contains many interesting results, it does not link a country's success or failure to key country characteristics; nor does it provide a method for separating the price e¤ects of market integration from other important impacts such as technology transfer, changes in population size or improvements in monitoring.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we set out the model. In Section 3 we de…ne our categories of countries and link management regimes to world prices.
In Section 4 we present our four applications, and in section 5 discuss how our results would change if governments invest in monitoring or use a di¤erent …ne structure. Section 6
concludes. An appendix contains all proofs.
The Model
We consider a resource-rich small open economy populated by a continuum of agents with mass N . Following Blanchard (1985) we assume agents face a constant instantaneous probability of death given by . Every instant in time has new births equal to aggregate deaths, N , leaving the steady state population N …xed. The economy has a renewable resource held in common by all agents. Agents are endowed with one unit of labor per unit time. Labor may be allocated to harvesting from the renewable resource or production of manufactures.
The government manages the resource by choosing harvest restrictions to maximize a utilitarian objective function de…ned over the welfare of both current and future generations. The government's actions are however constrained by the incentive of agents to cheat.
Agents
Agents consume two goods: H, the harvest from the renewable resource; and M , a manufacturing good. Tastes are homothetic, hence indirect utility can be written as a function of real income. Agents are risk neutral and we index generations of agents by their vintage or birth year v. Denote by U (R(v; t)) the instantaneous utility ‡ow from consumption when an agent of vintage v at time t has real income of R(v; t). Then the expected present discounted value of lifetime utility for a representative member of vintage v becomes:
where is the pure rate of time preference. In writing (1) we exploit the fact that when the instantaneous probability of death is per unit time, an agent's time of death is distributed exponentially with an expected lifetime of 1= .
Agents must decide how to allocate their time between the manufacturing and resource sectors, taking into account the returns from each activity, and the bene…ts and costs of complying with government regulations. This decision will depend on technology, endowments, and the monitoring technology, which we now specify.
Technologies and Endowments
Denote the resource stock level by S. The growth function for the renewable resource is assumed to be logistic and given by:
where r is the intrinsic rate of resource growth, K is the carrying capacity of the resource stock and G(S) denotes natural growth.
Harvesting from the resource depends on labor input and the prevailing stock. Adopting the Schaefer (1957) model for harvesting we have:
where is a productivity parameter, and L h denotes the labor allocated to harvesting. The manufacturing technology has constant returns to scale and uses only labor; hence by choice of units we have:
Finally, full employment requires:
The Resource Manager' s Problem
The resource management problem is made di¢ cult by the prospect of cheating and the necessity of weighing utility gains accruing to di¤erent generations. We adopt the utilitarian objective function developed by Calvo and Obstfeld (1988) that aggregates across the utility of di¤erent generations and leads to time-consistent optimal plans. We assume the government has the same pure rate of time preference as agents. In this situation, the Calvo and Obstfeld objective function yields social welfare as:
Equation (6) has three important properties. First, social welfare is independent of the individual speci…c risk of death, . This occurs because agents discount by the probability of death -they are mortal -but the government does not because society is in…nitely lived.
Second, utility ‡ows are discounted by the common (to both agents and the government) pure rate of time preference. 5 Third, social welfare is just N times the utility of a hypothetical in…nitely lived representative agent with real income path R(t). These features simplify the planning problem tremendously despite the generational structure and allow us to consider the very useful simplifying case where the government's discount rate, , approaches zero but agents remain impatient (i.e. + > 0).
The government devises a set of rules to maximize overall welfare subject to agents' incentive to over-harvest. Each agent is allocated a …xed amount of time to exploit the commons. Agents who cheat on this allocation are detected at the rate dt. An agent who follows the rules or is not caught cheating can keep all of the harvest produced. An agent caught cheating is subject to a …ne of F . Many di¤erent instruments are used to manage resource industries: individual transferable quotas, bag limits, quotas, limits on capacity or inputs, and technology standards. While these instruments vary in their ability to make cheating more costly, the key regulatory problem is that agents actions are not perfectly observable. We model resource policy as a restriction on e¤ort, but the same fundamental problem arises regardless of the choice of policy instrument. 
The Incentive Constraint
To render the agents' decision problem interesting, we make two assumptions. First, we assume the resource is capable of generating rents so agents will want to capture them.
Denote the relative price of the harvest by p, and the wage available in manufacturing by w, then, using (3) rents earned with one unit of labor are simply:
we give the government a higher rate of time preference then harvesting is more aggressive and it is easier to support the …rst best. 6 Restrictions on inputs can be undone by agents if they can substitute towards unregulated inputs (a bigger boat, a better gun or a more powerful chain saw); restrictions on output can be undone by quota busting and high grading; and buy backs which lower capacity can be undone by applying better technology and more inputs. In short, whenever rents are available economic actors will prove to be ingenious in their attempts to capture them. This is why monitoring is the key resource management problem: instrument choice can at best make monitoring easier. On this point in general, and problems with ITQs in particular see Copes (1986) . Second, we assume there is overcapacity in the resource sector. Setting natural growth in (2) equal to the harvest in (3) we …nd there is a simple negative relationship between the resource stock and the labor allocated to harvesting in steady state:
Therefore, the consistent application of labor in harvesting equal to r= leads to extinction.
The total labor force available for harvesting is N and hence a natural de…nition for an economy's capacity to harvest would be N=(r= ). 2 [0; 1] and is free of units.
When 1, the allocation of all the economy's labor to the resource sector leads to extinction: in this case, there is overcapacity and some form of regulation is necessary to generate rents. When < 1, there are situations where regulation is unnecessary. An examination of the < 1 case shows it is broadly similar to the overcapacity case, although it leads to a few surprises as discussed in Section 4.3.
With these two assumptions in hand, all agents would like to work full time in the resource sector when the stock is su¢ ciently large, but full time employment by all is not sustainable.
Denote the amount of labor time an agent is authorized to harvest by l 1, then an agent who complies with the rules earns ph = p lS in the resource sector and (1 l)w in the manufacturing sector. An agent who cheats spends their one unit of time harvesting and earns ph C = p S.
The decision to cheat rests on a comparison of the expected present discounted value of the nominal income stream earned by each activity. Let V C (t) represent the expected present discounted value of the income stream for an agent who is currently working in the resource sector and cheating. Let V N C (t) represent the income stream to an agent who is in the resource sector but not cheating. Let V R (t) be the maximum over these two options at t (it represents the expected present discounted value of being able to work in the resource sector at time t). An agent who works only in the manufacturing sector has a discounted income stream given by V M (t).
Consider the returns to cheating over some small time interval dt. The agent earns the cheating level of harvest, ph C dt but bears the risk he may be caught and …ned. If the agent is caught cheating (which occurs at rate dt), he pays a …ne of F (t + dt). With probability 1 dt, the agent is not caught and pays no …ne. Future returns are discounted, and the agent dies over the interval with probability dt. These assumptions imply that the expected present value return to cheating, V C (t), can be written as:
An agent who does not cheat obtains the value of the not-cheat option given by:
At every point in time agents choose the maximum over these options
and hence will not cheat if (10) is greater than (9). Expanding (9) and (10), letting dt go to zero, and simplifying shows an agent will not cheat when expected costs exceed bene…ts
where the rents to cheating are C , and the rents to behaving are = ph lw.
Several observations follow. First, not surprisingly, cheating is deterred when expected costs exceed bene…ts: the left hand side of (11) is the expected cost of cheating while the right hand side is the bene…t. Second, given agents are risk neutral, only the product F matters and not its individual components. This simpli…es our analysis and allows us to focus on how changes in the size of the …ne F a¤ect compliance leaving a discussion of how the manager may want to vary until Section 5. Finally, although the manager would like to impose an extremely large …ne, limited liability is often invoked to bound penalties in similar situations. Here we assume the maximum penalty available to the resource manager is to terminate the agent's right of access to the resource. This is equivalent to imposing a limited liability constraint that the agent can be no worse o¤ than being employed permanently in manufacturing. 7 Unless the manager could, in addition, con…scate an agent's entire future income stream from working in the outside goods sector (a possibility we consider later), the maximum punishment available is the seizure of a cheating agent's only asset -their right to harvest.
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In this case, we can write the …ne as
, or in terms of primitives:
This …ne is both simple and powerful. It is powerful because as rents in the resource sector rise, the deterrent value of losing access rises; it is simple because the …ne adjusts automatically to changes in prices, technologies, etc. These two properties ensure that the punishment for cheating re ‡ects the severity of the crime. Our mechanism to generate compliance should also be familar, as it is similar to that at work in e¢ ciency wage models (Shapiro and Stiglitz, 1984) . Agents with access to the resource stock can earn rents, provided they follow the rules and do not over-harvest. They will be deterred from cheating if the rents are su¢ ciently high -and hence access to the resource stock is analogous to having a good job that they don't want to lose.
It proves useful in what follows to collect parameters and de…ne a government's enforcement power as
and is free of units. By construction, enforcement power ranges from one (no power at all) to positive in…nity (maximum power).
7 There are two natural candidates for a limited liability constraint in our context. The …rst is that an agent who is caught and …ned cannot be worse o¤ than in manufacturing: i.e. V R F V M . They can lose at most all their assets when …ned. The second possibility is that the agent could in addition to losing their assets also have some or all of their future returns from manufacturing con…scated; i.e. V R F 0. We impose the …rst constraint here, and consider a more general version of the second in section 5. See Innes (1990) for the introduction of limited liability in a moral hazard context. 8 That is, we can think of the agents as being born with the right to a harvesting license, but this license is terminated if harvesting rules are violated. As Ostrom (1990) and Baland and Platteau (1996; chapter 12) note, …nes or punishments typically escalate with ostracism (or exclusion from the resource) being a …nal recourse. It is easy to incorporate smaller punishments into our model, but these will not be optimal.
It is increasing in the probability of being caught and punished, , but falls if agents have shorter expected life times 1= , or higher pure rates of time preference, . A government's enforcement power re ‡ects not only its ability to catch and punish cheaters, but also how agents view the prospect of future punishments.
Substituting (12) into (11), and evaluating in steady state we …nd an agent will not cheat when C = .
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The manager must ensure rents per agent obtained by behaving, , exceed a fraction of the potential rents earned by cheating with this fraction determined by enforcement power. To go further note = l C , let L = N l, and rewrite the incentive
This constraint can be met in one of two ways. First, if resource rents are positive at the current stock, then C > 0 and we can cancel it from both sides obtaining:
When rents are positive, the incentive constraint can only be met if the fraction of time each agent is allowed to harvest, L=N , exceeds a threshold determined by enforcement power. By rearranging we …nd the aggregate amount of time agents must be allowed to harvest, and denote it by L T . We denote the implied steady state stock S T . Using (8) and (13) we …nd:
It is however possible that L = L T is inconsistent with positive rents; i.e. p S T w < 0.
In this case, the incentive constraint is satis…ed only when there are zero rents in the resource sector. To …nd this second solution, set C = 0 and use (8) 
9 Outside of steady state the constraint becomes
For future purposes we note that the labor employed under open access is rising in the resource price. A higher resource price creates incipient rents that must be eliminated by greater e¤ort that drives the resource stock lower. As the resource price approaches in…nity, the labor employed under open access approaches r= and the stock approaches zero.
Putting the two solutions together we conclude that when (14) is consistent with positive resource rents, the manager must allow agents to spend at minimum the fraction of time that satis…es (13) with equality. But when this amount of time, added up over all agents, would eliminate all rents, the best the manger can do is throw up his hands and allow agents to harvest all they want. We refer to this situation as de facto open access. Property rights over the resource are present; it is only the severity of the monitoring problem that leads to an outcome indistinguishable from a situation where there are no property rights at all.
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This discussion implies the incentive constraint is met, in steady state, when:
The Steady State Economy
The resource manager maximizes (6) by choosing a time allocation l(t) that each agent can spend harvesting, subject to technologies given in (3) and (4), full employment in (5), biological growth in (2), and the incentive constraint (16). There are three possible solutions.
The …rst occurs when the incentive constraint does not bind at the …rst best level of labor. To characterize this solution we ignore (16) and solve a standard optimal control problem using L h as the control. Denote the solution to the unconstrained …rst best by L and the resulting steady state stock by S .
10 This is an important distinction.
Overcoming de facto open access requires solving the monitoring problem; correcting a situation of true open access requires both creating property rights and solving the monitoring problem. Demsetz (1967) and much of the resulting law and economics literature is primarily concerned with this latter case as is the literature that views property rights as the outcome of cooperation in dynamic games. For a recent contribution in this area see Tarui (2007) . It is however unclear whether the rent dissipation we observe around the world arises from monitoring problems or a true lack of property rights. We suspect much of it arises from monitoring problems.
A second possibility arises when L violates (16) because it is too low. In this situation agents who cheat obtain a great windfall since the additional time they gain in harvesting (1 l) is relatively large and the productivity of their e¤orts is also great because S is relatively high. To o¤set these incentives, the government raises the allowed time in harvesting. This reduces the time left over for any individual agent to cheat, and lowers the productivity of cheaters by driving down the resource stock. Eventually, the allowed harvest time is high enough to remove the incentive to cheat and (16) Proof: see Appendix.
Proposition 1 sets out the possibilities, but it does not link these possibilities to country characteristics, world prices, or a country's trade regime. To understand the challenge that managers face in setting limits on harvesting while trying to achieve the …rst best, we will need to examine the …rst best solution more closely.
Routine calculations show that the unconstrained …rst best allocation, L , and its asso-ciated stock, S , satisfy:
whereĉ h < 0 is the percentage change in unit harvesting costs, w= S, created by a marginal increase in the stock. The intuition for the condition is well known. Leaving a marginal unit of the stock in situ is an investment of foregone rents, C , and this investment must earn . To earn , the stock is adjusted so that the marginal unit left in situ raises steady state harvests by G 0 (S ) with value C while reducing harvesting costs by the incrementĉ h applied to all units harvested in steady state G(S ).
Straightforward di¤erentiation of (17) shows optimal harvesting rises and the optimal resource stock falls as the price of the resource good rises. The intuition is simply that as the resource price rises, the opportunity cost of leaving rents in situ rises relative to the cost reduction a greater stock provides. This result is important because it means that meeting the incentive constraint will be easier with higher resource prices. While this is true, the extent to which the manager responds to prices depends importantly on what we will call the incentive to extinguish a resource, , with ( + r)=r. 2 [1; 1], is free of units and will vary across resources and countries. The incentive to extinguish plays an important role in our analysis because it determines the maximum harvesting e¤ort expended in the …rst best. At very high prices, only the foregone rent component of the return in (17) matters and the …rst best simpli…es to = G 0 (S ) with L = (r + )=2 .
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To put this level of e¤ort in perspective divide by r= (the labor force that produces extinction) to …nd L =(r= ) = (r + )=2r = =2. Therefore, when the maximal instantaneous return on the resource, r, exceeds the time preference rate, , then < 2 and adjusting the resource stock to earn a competitive return is possible without extinguishing the resource. We refer to 11 See the proof to Proposition 1 in the Appendix for a derivation. 12 Subsitute for the percentage cost reduction to …nd the …rst best is C = G 0 (S ) C + G(S )=S : Divide both sides by C ; assume S is bounded above zero, and take the limit as p goes to in…nity.
the < 2 case as a low incentive to extinguish the resource. Conversely, the incentive to extinguish is high when > 2, and the resource can never earn a competitive return even in the limit as it is extinguished. Therefore, while higher prices lead to greater harvesting, the aggressiveness of this harvesting depends critically on the incentive to extinguish.
Country Characteristics and the Management Regime
Our goal is to provide a simple and intuitive set of conditions linking country characteristics to the likelihood of success or failure in resource management. We …nd three key forces determine the success or failure of resource management: the enforcement power of the government, the extent of overcapacity in the resource sector, and the incentive to extinguish the resource.
The basic intuition is simple. Enforcement power determines the extent to which harvesting e¤ort can be reduced to protect the resource. If enforcement power is su¢ ciently weak relative to overcapacity, then a regulator will never be able to improve on open access. This is a Hardin economy. If enforcement power is su¢ ciently strong, then harvesting e¤ort can be restricted enough to generate some resource rents. Whether or not the …rst best can be obtained depends on whether enforcement power is strong enough to reduce harvesting below the level that is needed to implement the …rst best; and the …rst best harvesting e¤ort depends on the regulator's incentive to extinguish the resource. A high discount rate, for example, gives the regulator a strong incentive to run down the resource stock; and this makes the …rst best easier to implement because less enforcement power is needed. Transitions from open access to rent-generating outcomes can occur via changes in technology or monitoring ability (these a¤ect capacity and enforcement power) or via price changes. Higher prices increase market pressure on the resource, but also increase the penalty for cheating;
and if the penalty for cheating is the loss of havesting license, these two e¤ects o¤set each other. Hence price increases do not a¤ect enforcement power. However, price increases also increase the …rst best level of harvesting e¤ort, and this makes the regulator's job easier, because a smaller share of capacity needs to be excluded from harvesting at higher prices. Proof: see Appendix.
The intuition is straightforward. We have assumed there is excess capacity in the resource sector: > 1. By de…nition, if all of the economy's capacity was applied to resource harvesting, then the resource would be driven to extinction. Enforcement power determines that portion of this capacity a government can credibly deter from harvesting. It is as if the manager's enforcement power shrinks excess capacity by 1= , to = . But if this reduced capacity is still greater than that needed to drive the resource to extinction, then = > 1.
In this case, the capacity the manager cannot deter from harvesting is still large enough to dissipate any rents the resource may provide and we obtain a Hardin economy. While open access is a necessary outcome in a Hardin economy, other countries will be able to sustain a rent-generating management regime at some prices. These countries may have greater enforcement power because their legal system or monitoring capabilities are better, or they may have been able to lower harvesting capacity through other means. Our second result is that even when countries have relatively strong enforcement power or only limited capacity so in principle they could sustain rents ( = < 1), they will still exhibit open access as an equilibrium outcome when the resource price is very low. In fact, at low
resource prices, open access is the equilibrium outcome in all countries.
Proposition 3. Whenever (7) holds and there is overcapacity in the resource sector, all economies will exhibit open access and zero rents at low resource prices.
Proof: see Appendix.
This is a somewhat surprising result, but the logic is straightforward. Enforcement power can lower the portion of capacity the manager must allow to harvest, but it cannot drive it to zero. When the price of the resource is very low, resource rents are only positive when the resource stock is very high -perhaps very close to its carrying capacity (recall 7).
To maintain such a large stock, agents must spend very little time harvesting; and herein lies the rub: this small amount of e¤ort will be less than what the manager can credibly bar from harvesting. Therefore, for low enough resource prices, all rents will be dissipated and an open access equilibrium results.
Proposition 3 is important because it tells us that all economies will look like Hardin economies if they face low resource prices, even though some of them may be able to sustain rents at higher prices. In a world with purely exogenous property rights, we could be assured that a country exhibiting open access at some prices exhibits them at all prices; in a world with endogenous property rights, this is a dangerous supposition.
To see why rents can be sustained at higher prices, consider increasing p from the level 
The …rst inequality rules out Hardin economies; the second says the …rst best will always call for less e¤ort than the capacity the manager must allow to harvest given its enforcement power. Recall that at very high prices the …rst best labor allocation (measured relative to extinction labor) equals =2. Therefore, when the incentive to extinguish is low relative to the capacity the manager cannot deter from harvesting, the …rst best will never be achieved. Clark economies are those where (all else equal) there is strong enforcement power, not much overcapacity, and a strong incentive to extinguish. In terms of primitives, resource growth a¤ects both our measures of capacity and the incentive to extinguish. A higher rate of resource growth raises the instantaneous rate of return earned on any stock, and this makes the planner less aggressive in lowering the stock to generate a competitive return, but a higher resource growth rate also reduces our measure of capacity since it means the resource sector can absorb more e¤ort without driving the resource to zero. Simple algebra shows a higher resource growth rate always works towards successful regulation; hence slow growing marginal resources are the most di¢ cult to manage successfully. A similar issue arises with the rate of time preference. A higher rate of time preference lowers enforcement power, but raises the aggressiveness of the planner by raising the incentive to extinguish.
One result is clear. If we start from either an Ostrom or Clark economy and raise time preference su¢ ciently, we must obtain a Hardin economy.
We now combine our results to prove: Proof: see Appendix.
Proposition 4 forces us to ask what part of the observed variation in property rights
protection worldwide is consistent with governments doing the best they can under di¢ cult situations. Success should vary across countries that di¤er in their enforcement power whether this variation comes about from di¤erences in life expectancy, in time preference or in political economy factors that determine their ability to capture and punish cheaters.
Other di¤erences would arise when population size, technologies or resource growth rates leave some countries with more or less overcapacity in their resource sectors. And …nally, countries could di¤er in the the extent to which their resources have a low or high incentive to extinguish. Variation in management success may also show up across resources within a given country, since monitoring ability, resource growth rates and harvesting technology are all likely to be resource speci…c.
Applications
Property rights issues are at the center of debates over protecting biodiversity, limiting deforestation and improving the health of …sheries. Much of the theoretical work examining these issues takes the strength of regulatory regimes as …xed or exogenous. While this may be a reasonable assumption in the short run, in the long run we expect adjustment in the protection given resources if world markets value them more highly, if population increases, or if technology changes. Once we accept that the success of resource management should vary with resource and country speci…c circumstances, it becomes much easier to understand episodes where property rights improved or worsened as the result of shocks such as new technologies, or why some countries succeeded with the imposition of entirely new management regimes while others failed.
The purpose of this section is to demonstrate that while our model is highly stylized, it has broad relevance and provides several insights relevant to policy debates in di¤erent renewable resource industries.
Trade Liberalization
Much of the concern over the e¤ects of globalization on the environment stems from the weak protection a¤orded resources in many developing countries. Brander and Taylor (1997) and Chichilnisky (1994) have shown that a country exporting an open access renewable resource will experience increased resource depletion and may experience a real income decline as trade is liberalized. This is because a trade-induced increase in the resource price attracts entry into the resource sector and exacerbates the open-access externality.
Once we allow for endogenous responses of the management regime, we obtain a richer set of predictions. A straightforward application of the results of the previous section implies that trade liberalization can, in some cases, lead to the emergence of an e¤ective management regime. This is because a trade-induced increase in the resource price in an exporting industry makes it easier for Ostrom and Clark economies to satisfy the incentive constraint and enforce harvest restrictions. Consequently, in some cases where the BranderTaylor model predicts a fall in steady state real income as a result of trade, our model predicts an increase in real income. Our model also predicts heterogeneity across resource-exporting countries in the impact of trade liberalization. Hardin economies will always experience resource depletion and a steady state real income reduction.
To avoid taxonomy (and to facilitate comparison with Brander and Taylor (1997) Without careful empirical work, it is di¢ cult to come up with de…nitive evidence that trade has help induced transitions in management in some cases and failed to do so in others. However, there are some suggestive examples. Demsetz (1967) have been allowed to export from their wild populations of Annex I species subject to strict quotas.
Wildlife
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In each of these cases, countries earn rents on their wildlife resources by selling wildlife products at world prices, but have to meet certain performance requirements on reporting, harvesting, and enforcement set out by CITES. If a country fails to meet these requirements, the CITES Secretariat, in concert with the Conference of Parties, will move to end the experiment and stop all trade. Therefore, the incentives faced by a country exporting an Annex I species under a liberalization experiment, are quite similar to the incentives facing the agents in our theory. CITES plays the role of resource manager while country governments are akin to our agents. 14 To apply our model, think of the imposition of the CITES regime as an exogenous change that created a resource manager with some powers to sanction (in this case the option of preventing trade While Crocodilians demonstrate a commercial and conservation success, our theory suggests caution in applying the Crocodilian case more broadly. Proposition 5 predicts that success in these liberalization experiments should vary with resource-speci…c attributes.
Crocodilians have several biological features conducive to successful managment: they have a very fast intrinsic growth rate; their wild populations are localized making monitoring of harvesting relatively easy; and the primary product derived from harvesting (their hides)
are readily distinguishable and easily tagged making monitoring relatively e¤ective. Easy and e¤ective monitoring raises enforcement power; fast growth limits overcapacity. These 15 Our model is not well suited to answer the question of whether the overall population of the species rises or falls. Within our one resource stock model, higher prices always produce lower stocks; but higher prices also provide a greater return to the resource. In our model this higher return is brought back in line with agent's time preference rate by dissipating the stock. In a more general model, the higher return would presumably allow habitat and resource stocks to expand in response. 16 For an excellent overview of the history of CITES regulation as it pertains to Crocodilians, see Kievit (2000) . 17 For details on the exporting countries, speci…c species, volume and value of trade, see Caldwell (2004) . In contrast, many charismatic megafauna exhibit very di¤erent characteristics making the liklihood of bene…cial trade less likely. They feature: slow intrinsic growth rates, large territorial ranges making monitoring di¢ cult; and products that are hard to distinguish from those illegally obtained. In these cases, the role trade could play in fostering conservation is likely to be very limited, and CITES experiments with limited trade have not proven very successful. CITES experiment with a quota system on elephants in the 1980s proved to be a disaster, leading to the ban on the ivory trade in 1989 which is largely still in e¤ect. 
Fisheries
Up to this point, we have emphasized the role of relative price changes in inducing a transition in the e¤ectiveness of management. Transitions can also occur in response to other types of shocks, and the most important of these is technological change. In this section, we focus on …sheries. Our model predicts that improvements in harvesting technology will lead to the introduction of restrictions on …sh harvesting, that management will be more successful for some …sheries than for others, and that eventually even neutral technological progress (in both harvesting and monitoring) can destroy management regimes.
Technical change and its induced increase in e¤ective harvesting capacity has been a key factor threatening the viability of …sh stocks. Pauly et al. (2002) note that many of the …sheries that were sustainable in the past survived only because …sh were out of the range of traditional …shers. 19 As technological change put increased pressure on …sh stocks, the need for e¤ective management increased. Hannesson (2004) argues that improvements in 18 For more on elephants see the very interesting paper by Kremer and Morcom (2000) . The latest CITES Conference of Parties did alter the restrictions somewhat (see www.cites.org for details).
19 There are numerous examples of how technological progress has increased pressure on …sheries -Heazle and Butcher (2007) for example note that in 1960, less than 1500 ( 1%) of the …shing boats in Indonesia had any kind of motor, while by 2002 there were over 5000 …shing vessels of "industrial scale". The introduction of …sh …nding technology, on-board freezers, electronic communication equipment, are just a few of the other innovations that have increased pressure on …sh stocks. harvesting technology and the ensuing pressure on …sh stocks was a major factor contributing to the emergence of modern rights-based …sheries management.
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To see how technical change can induce a transition to active management, consider a …shery where harvesting capacity is low, and hence managers have no need to introduce quotas. That is, suppose initially that our measure of capacity = N 0 =r < 1 because the initial level of the harvesting technology parameter 0 is low. This means that there is not enough harvesting capacity to fully extinguish the stock and Hardin economies do not exist. The manager's problem now has an additional constraint: L h N . Employment in harvesting cannot exceed the total amount of labour available. This constraint was not made explicit previously because it can never bind when > 1.
Let L* denote the …rst best allocation of labour to the …shery when we ignore this additional constraint. There are two possibilities: either L h N binds or it doesn't. We start with the case where it binds; that is where L > N . This will always hold when capacity is su¢ ciently small. If L > N , then there is no need for the manager to restrict harvesting. The …rst best outcome is to simply let everybody …sh as much as desired.
Now suppose there is a large improvement in harvesting technology so that > 1, with the new level of the harvesting technology, 1 > 0 . There is now overcapacity in an unregulated …shery, and so the analysis of Section 3 applies. The manager will need to impose restrictions on harvesting to protect the stock and generate rents. If multiple …sheries experience the technological improvement, we would expect to see heterogeneity across …sheries in the e¤ectiveness of management: those …sheries where there is strong enforcement power or a fast growing resource will achieve the …rst best, while others with binding incentive constraints will have to tolerate some rent dissipation. 20 Another key factor necessary for e¤ective management of many …sheries was the Law of the Sea Convention that led to the establishment of the 200 mile o¤shore exclusive economic zone. This ensured that …sheries within such zones were under the jurisdiction of a single country. Our model does not seek to explain the evolution of international law. Rather, we focus on …sheries that are under the jurisdiction of a single country (or local government), and we ask which of these …sheries will be well managed, which will not be well managed, and what are the factors that can trigger a change in the e¤ectiveness of the management regime.
In our model, the manager's restriction on harvesting e¤ort is equivalent to an individual harvest quota, which is a policy that has been adopted in a number of …sheries since the mid 1980's, most notably in New Zealand and Iceland. In reality the types of instruments used to regulate …sheries have varied widely -including restrictions on mesh size of nets, length of season, number of boats, restrictions on e¤ort, harvest quotas, and many others.
It is beyond the scope of our paper to try to explain instrument choice; 21 the main point is that no instrument alone solves the manager's problem -each requires monitoring and enforcement, and hence an incentive constraint limits the ability of some managers to obtain the …rst best.
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Although individual harvest quotas have a number of advantages over alternative instruments, monitoring is required to ensure that quotas are complied with, and highgrading (discarding lower value …sh) may be exacerbated under a quota systen a potential problem as lower value …sh may be discarded (Copes, 1986; Branch et al., 2006) . in illegal …shing during this period and argue that a major reason for this failure was a weak enforcement and monitoring system; in our model, this would correspond to a low . Similarly, Hauck and Kroese (2006) …nd that signi…cant compliance problems have contributed to stock declines in South Africa. Consistent with the predictions of our model, there is 21 Hannesson (2004) notes that the instruments used in …shery regulation have often undergone a progression -initially season closures or age/size restrictions might be used, followed by overall caps on the total allowable catch, entry restrictions. and in some cases by individual quotas. Libecap (2007) argues that heterogeneity among …shers, uncertainty about who will gain and lose from regulation, and political economy considerations can explain the choice and timing of the use of regulatory instruments. Our model abstracts from this by assuming identical …shers and focusses on the monitoring problem. Even with no political economy problems, monitoring problems will imply that some …sheries will be managed well while other are managed poorly if at all. 22 The importance of monitoring in …sheries has been explicitly considered in the literature on enforcement of …sheries regulations. Sutinen and Anderson (1985) is an early contribution and Nostbakken (forthcoming) provides a review. also heterogeneity of success within countries. A comparison of the abalone and geoduck …sheries o¤ the west coast of Canada is instructive. Both …sheries were under pressure in the late 1970s from high demand from export markets and technological improvement in harvesting and this pressure led to attempts to introduced efective management regimes.
Individual quota systems were introduced to manage both …sheries; they were succesful in the case of geoduck but not for abalone. Evidence indicates that di¢ culties of monitoring led to signi…cant levels of illegal …shing in the abalone …shery (Jones, 2003) . Monitoring was di¢ cult because of relatively easy access to abalone in relatively shallow waters in remote areas -in our model, this would correspond to low enforcement power. The …shery collapsed and was closed in 1990. On the other hand, the individual quota system for geoduck has been highly successful, in part because of the high quality of monitoring.
Although improvements in harvesting technology are a major catalyst for the development of …sheries management systems, continuous technological improvement undermine the manager's ability to manage the …shery by increasing overcapacity. All else equal, continuous increases in harvesting technology (a fall in ) would turn all economies into Hardin economies. However, technical progress can also lead to improvements in monitoring technology. In the long run, the viability of an e¤ective management regime requires that technical progress in monitoring keep pace with, or possibly exceed, that in harvesting. 
Forests
There is still considerable debate over the causes of deforestation worldwide despite almost three decades of intensive study. While popular accounts often link international trade to deforestation, academic work has focussed its attention on property rights issues and the related e¤ects of population growth on land conversion and fuelwood collection. Many empirical studies …nd evidence of a direct and positive relationship between population size and deforestation, which may arise because of incomplete property rights. 24 However, in a recent and in ‡uential empirical paper Foster and Rosenzweig (2003) argue that population and income growth may have played an important role in the recovery of Indian communal forests over the 1971-1999 period. In their analysis, population and income growth raise the relative price of forest products -such as fuelwood -which raises the return to this activity.
They suggest that the large increase in demand for forest products over the 1971-1999 period was in part responsible for the implementation of a new management program in India which allows local villagers to share in the proceeds of timber sales from communal forests (the Joint Forest Management Program). Importantly, the authors speculate that "without the shift in demand for forest products, e¤ective policy reforms expanding forests may not have been feasible." These comments echo our earlier results: a higher price for resource products may be a necessary precondition for a succesful policy reform, and distributing these rents to agents plays a key role in determining the success of resource management.
In this section we illustrate how our theoretical framework may be useful in interpreting the con ‡icting evidence on population growth and deforestation, and perhaps provide some guidance to future empirical work. In our small open economy framework the relationship between the size of the population and measures of the resource's health such as rents or stock size is decidely negative. This is true because a greater population raises capacity, and this always works against e¤ective management. In a Hardin economy, population growth can only drive the stock lower and may eliminate it entirely; in an Ostrom economy, population growth will at …rst dissipate rents, then lead to open access and eventually result in a Hardin economy. In a Clark economy a similar result holds.
While these small open economy results accord reasonably well with the empirical literature …nding a negative link between population and forests, they are harder to reconcile with the recent work of Foster and Rosenzweig (2003) . By closing our model to allow for endoge-nous prices changes, we …nd population growth has two e¤ects on resource management in a closed economy. Population growth raises the domestic relative price of resource products and this works in favor of successful regulation, but it also raises capacity and this works against it. Only the impact of greater capacity is present in our small open economy, but in a closed economy prices will adjust and this bene…cial impact can outweigh the capacity raising e¤ect under some circumstances, which we now specify.
To simplify assume constant elasticity preferences over the two consumption goods, and Population growth raises the relative price of the resource product making regulation successful despite the increase in population size. It does so, only when demand for the resource product is inelastic. This is not surprising: we require a strong price response to population growth to o¤set its negative e¤ects in raising capacity. When a strong price response is not forthcoming -as in our small open economy case -open access remains.
Foster and Rosenweig argue that the strength of the price response is in fact key to their results, and provide estimates implying a price elasticity of demand for …rewood below one.
Moreover, in addition to their detailed empirical work on India, Foster and Rosenzweig also provide more broad based evidence from a panel of over 50 developing countries …nding that growth lowers deforestation in relatively closed economies, but raises it in open economies. This is very close to what Proposition 6 and our previous results imply. 25 The Clark case is similar.
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We have adopted a relatively simple model to explore the interaction of world prices, technologies and resource management. In this section we discuss two of our assumptions and argue that our basic results are not sensitive to reasonable departures from them.
Monitoring
Assume that instead of an exogenous probability of being caught, this probability can be raised by government action. Suppose the government can hire monitors at the current manufacturing wage. Let the probability of being caught over the interval dt be related to labor allocated to enforcement over this interval, L e dt, by dt = 0 L e dt where 0 is a positive constant re ‡ecting the productivity of monitoring. By construction the instantaneous probability of being caught is linear in L e , but monitoring is never perfect. It is straightforward then to write the total ‡ow cost of achieving a rate of catching cheaters as C( ) = w = 0 , which is linear in . As a consequence, enforcement power is now endogenous and should be written to re ‡ect this as ( ).
Given space limitations, we focus on steady states and assume is close to zero. The government's problem is to maximize steady state surplus less monitoring costs. We solve this in two stages. Let ( ) denote maximized rents for given . This is in fact the problem considered in earlier sections. 26 We now write it to emphasize the role of .
The optimal choice of is given by: = arg max f ( ) C( )g. This problem has several important properties which follow from our previous results. The …rst is simply that hetero-26 Set the discount rate equal to zero in (17) and rewrite the …rst order condition as This outcome is more likely if the monitoring technology is ine¢ cient or the extent of overcapacity large. In situtions with better monitoring technologies or less overcapacity it will pay to invest in monitoring. The optimal solution will be interior and the manager will successfully restrict harvesting. We again …nd that di¤erences in country characteristics (such as the resource growth rate, population, and technology) matter since they shift the pro…t function. Consequently, our earlier result that there is heterogeneity across countries in the e¤ectiveness of their management regime applies here; and the same factors that increased the likelihood of successful management also apply. Our earlier result that trade can induce transitions in the management regime continues to hold. Increases in the resource price shift the pro…t function upwards, which increases the likelihood of e¤ective management.
Endogenous monitoring does introduce some changes. Strictly speaking, all countries are now Ostrom economies. This is because as the resource price p goes to in…nity, the pro…t function shifts up arbitrarily high, which means that all countries can make a management transition if resource prices are su¢ ciently high. Moreover, the …rst best is never attained so Clark economies are not possible in this framework. 27 The reason is simply that increases in 27 The de…nition of a Clark economy tells us that at any resource price that can generate rents ((7) holds) there must exist a , such that enforcement power at this is so strong the …rst best can be obtained. For > , we again have 0 ( ) = 0. We have 0 ( p) = 0 as we take the derivative from the left, but dc=d > 0 for all . Hence the …rst order condition for a maximum will always be satis…ed to the left of p and although we may get close to a Clark economy, we will never reach it. We can obtain a Clark economy if we alter the monitoring technology to allow for some …xed base line probability of being caught with zero monitoring (as monitoring have a vanishingly small marginal bene…t as the economy gets close to the …rst best. In contrast, the marginal cost of monitoring remains …nite. However, if we consider a bounded set of resource prices (which is reasonable if resources have either domestic or foreign substitutes), then we once again obtain Hardin economies: within the relevant range of prices, some countries will always be in open access. And countries with resources easy to manage will be arbitrarily close to the …rst best.
Fines
We have assumed the …ne agents recieve when caught cheating can leave them no worse o¤ than they would be if they were employed permanently in manufacturing. A more draconian …ne could, in addition, con…scate some fraction of the agent's future earnings in manufactur- Several observations follow. When > 0, the planner has more latitude in reducing L towards the …rst best. This is simply because the punishment is greater at any level of rents.
But achieving the …rst best is still not guaranteed because when rents rise the threat of losing future returns to work in manufacturing becomes insigni…cant relative to the bene…ts of cheating (w= C falls). In fact, the additional component of the …ne works best in low rent situations. It was a feature of our previous analysis that the costs and bene…ts of cheating approached zero at the same rate. This was responsible for our simple condition describing Hardin economies, and it meant that in low rent environments punishments were also low. This strikes us as reasonable. But if we assume is not zero, our previous in the speci…cation in earlier sections of the paper).
result of open access Hardin economies will be replaced by low-rent equilibria with some limits on harvests. Hence, the major change that a larger punishment brings to our analysis is that the pure open access case is replaced by outcomes with almost, but not quite, all rent dissipated. Strictly speaking, Hardin economies will not exist, but countries where the resource is hard to manage (in the sense discussed earlier in the paper) will be arbitrarily close to open access. Moreover, if monitoring itself consumes resources, as discussed above, then open access outcomes will again result because the bene…ts of monitoring are also small in low rent situations.
Conclusions
The purpose of this paper was to develop a simple theory of endogenous resource management to help us understand the spectacular variation we see in the protection given renewable resources worldwide. The theoretical literature has, to a large extent, focussed on either the extreme of no property rights protection or the extreme of perfect property rights protection.
While these polar cases are useful theoretical constructs, they cannot explain why some resources are well managed and some poorly or why some countries succeed and others fail.
Citing property rights failures as the the reason for poor management begs the question and does not answer it. Existing analyses which take the degree of property rights protection as …xed also provide us with little guidance in a world where property rights are instead ‡exible and market sensitive institutions that adjust to changed conditions brought about by international trade, technological progress or population growth.
As a …rst step towards resolving these issues, we constructed a relatively simple theory where the e¢ cacy of resource management, and hence the de facto property rights regime, is endogenously determined. The model was dynamic to capture the key externality in renewable resource industries, and it featured a simple monitoring problem since limiting harvests is the key managment problem. The resource manager attempts to choose harvest policies to internalize externalities but because of imperfect monitoring, must contend with an incentive constraint.
We found that three basic forces determine success or failure in resource managment:
the extent of overcapacity in the resource sector, a government's enforcement power, and the ability of the resource to generate competitive returns without being extinguished. We used these constructs to divide resource rich economies into three categories according to their potential for improved resource management as the value of resources rises. By doing so we generated the limiting cases of open access and perfect management as endogenous outcomes and linked these outcomes to primitive country and resource characteristics.
To demonstrate the potential usefulness of our theory as a guide to policy we presented four applications.
In total these applications demonstrate how the impacts of trade liberalization, technological progress and economic growth can di¤er quite radically across countries and resources. On balance we found that trade liberalization appears more favorable for resource exporting countries than previously thought, but if market integration also brings new technologies these tend to destabilize management systems. We also demonstrated that the impact of population growth on resource use may be very di¤erent in open versus closed economies. While some countries may never escape the tragedy of the commons, others will and our framework links the possibility of escape to a relatively small number of country characteristics. The obvious empirical challenge is to now ask how well these country characteristics explain the spectacular cross-country variation we observe in the success of resource management worldwide.
Proof of Proposition 1. In a steady state, all time derivatives are zero; therefore the optimal choice for L H must satisfy (16). When the constraint binds, L H equals either L T or L O .
When the constraint does not bind, the …rst best L can be found by maximizing the following current value Hamiltonian:
Note (p) is a price index, and the Hamiltonian is linear in the control. To rule out corner solutions note L H = N will drive the resource to extinction because > 1. This can never be optimal with …nite p. As a result, manufacturing is always produced and hence w = 1 in any steady state. L H = 0 is inconsistent with meeting the incentive constraint in steady state (since 7 holds). The remaining …rst order necessary conditions yield:
(20) and (21) solve for L H and S. Equation (21) is a negative and linear relationship between L H and S. At S = 0, L H = r= < N ; at S = K, L H = 0. Equation (20) gives L H as a monotonically increasing function of S. At S = 0, L H = (r )w= < r= . At S = K, we have L H = (( + r)= )(p K w) > 0 by (7). Therefore a solution exists with L H nonnegative. It is unique. Straightforward di¤erentiation of (20) and (21) show dL H =dp > 0 and dS=dp < 0. To obtain (17), multiply (20) by C , substitute for L H using (21) and di¤erentiate the unit cost function to obtain the result.
Proof of Proposition 2. Since the unconstrained …rst best always generates at least some rents when (7) Proof of Proposition 5. Because of homothetic preferences, steady state real income is:
where is steady state resource rents measured in terms of the numeraire, w = 1 because the economy is always diversi…ed in production, and is a price index increasing in p. (i).
In a Hardin economy, = 0, and so an increase in reduces R. (ii.). for p p + in a Clark or Ostrom economy then either the incentive constraint binds or the …rst best is obtained.
Since R has the properties of an indirect utility function, we can use Roy's identity to obtain:
where X is exports of H. If the constraint binds, dL H = 0 and so dR=d > 0. If the constraint does not bind then L H = 0, since rent is maximized, and so again dR=d > 0.
(iii) If p < p + then = 0, and so from (22), dR=d < 0. If p < p + but p > p + , then the elimination of trade frictions ( = 1) allows the incentive constraint to be satis…ed and either the …rst best or limited management obtains. If the …rst best obtains, then real income must rise because R( p) R ( p) < R (p), where R is …rst best real income and the second inequality follows since R is increasing in as shown in (ii) above. If constrained management obtains, then the result follows since real income increases in p without bound for given L H . (iv). Follows from the same argument in the …rst part of (iii) above. 
